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DIGITAL MULTI-MEDIA AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY LAW 
Jacqueline D. Lipton* 
While digital video and multi-media technologies are becoming increasing-
ly prevalent, existing privacy laws tend to focus on text-based personal 
records. Individuals have little recourse when concerned about infringe-
ments of their privacy interests in audio, video, and multi-media files. Often 
people are simply unaware that video or audio records have been made. 
Even if they are aware of the existence of the records, they may be unaware 
of potential legal remedies or unable to afford legal recourse. This paper 
concentrates on the ability of individuals to obtain legal redress for unau-
thorized use of audio, video, and multi-media content that infringes their 
privacy. It focuses on an analysis of the European Union Data Protection 
Directive. The Directive is one of the most comprehensive digital age legal 
reforms to address information privacy. Yet even the Directive suffers from 
shortcomings when applied to audio, video, and multi-media records. The 
author argues that global law reform is needed to bring privacy law into the 
age of digital video and multi-media. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on difficulties of applying existing privacy laws 
to digital multi-media files. There are a number of digital file formats, in-
cluding still images, audio recordings, video recordings, and combinations 
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of these formats in the form of digital multi-media files. Some of the con-
troversial issues surrounding digital multi-media files include the unautho-
rized gathering of data, as well as the unauthorized use of data, say, in the 
context of dissemination, analysis, or profiling activities. Historically, laws 
in many jurisdictions have treated unauthorized gathering and usage diffe-
rently. Laws have tended to focus either on information gathering or on 
information dissemination or use.1 Many legislatures have historically been 
concerned with intrusive information gathering practices rather than with 
subsequent uses of the information gathered.2 Nevertheless, recent laws in 
some jurisdictions have treated the two kinds of conduct as occurring on a 
continuum.3 Conceiving of these activities on a continuum makes sense 
given that much new digital technology enables gathering and dissemination 
to occur almost simultaneously at the push of a button.  
The ability of new digital devices such as cell phone cameras to 
transmit information wirelessly and globally raises important new chal-
lenges for privacy laws. Even laws such as the European Union Data Pro-
tection Directive (Directive), drafted in the mid-1990s, now seem dated. 
When the Directive was drafted, policy makers were predominantly con-
cerned with regulating text-based information rather than other formats of 
information, although they did contemplate the likely future rise in uses of 
“sound and image” data.4 In the 1990s, the Internet and associated technol-
  
 1  For example, anti-stalking legislation tends to focus specifically on information gather-
ing. For a comprehensive survey of state anti-stalking legislation, see NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STALKING, AND ANTISTALKING 
LEGISLATION A1 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/stlkbook.pdf. Laws re-
ferred to often as “anti-paparazzi” legislation likewise focus on information gathering prac-
tices rather than information dissemination practices subsequent to the information gathering. 
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (2009). Defamation law, on the other hand, traditionally 
focuses on information dissemination, as opposed to information gathering. See, e.g., 
PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES 11–46, § 1.01[1] (2010) (“Defamation . . . 
[is] the unprivileged publication of false communications, which naturally and proximately 
result in injury to another.”) (emphasis added). 
 2   Regarding anti-stalking and anti-paparazzi legislation, see NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
supra note 1; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (2009). 
 3  See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31 [hereinafter Directive], availa-
ble at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf. 
 4  Id. at recital 14 (“Whereas, given the importance of the developments under way, in the 
framework of the information society, of the techniques used to capture, transmit, manipu-
late, record, store or communicate sound and image data relating to natural persons, this 
Directive should be applicable to processing involving such data.”); recital 17 (“Whereas, as 
far as the processing of sound and image data carried out for purposes of journalism or the 
purposes of literary or artistic expression is concerned, in particular in the audiovisual field, 
the principles of the Directive are to apply in a restricted manner according to the provisions 
laid down in Article 9.”); art. 9. Article 9 reads: 
Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations from the provisions of 
this Chapter, Chapter IV and Chapter VI for the processing of personal data carried 
 
File: Lipton (#2).doc Created on: 5/11/2010 3:32:00 PM Last Printed: 5/11/2010 4:09:00 PM 
2010] DIGITAL MULTI-MEDIA 553 
ogy were in their relative infancy. System constraints—such as limited 
bandwidth—effectively restricted the amount and type of information that 
could be easily gathered, stored, and disseminated. As the technology de-
veloped, and bandwidth increased, so did the possibility of much more so-
phisticated transactions and transmissions of digital information in a variety 
of formats. This variety of formats raises new challenges for laws such as 
the Directive, and even for the privacy protections in the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR).5 
This paper takes as a case study the limitations of the Directive in 
protecting privacy interests in audio, video, and multi-media content. Part II 
examines the key provisions of the Directive that define and describe prohi-
bited activities with respect to personal information. These provisions in-
clude the Directive’s definitions of personal data and data processing, as 
well as the available defenses under the Directive. Part III identifies lessons 
that may be drawn from the European Union’s experience with the Direc-
tive for future global developments in privacy law. The rationale for taking 
the Directive as a case study is twofold. First, the Directive was aimed spe-
cifically at new developments in digital technology in the 1990s that af-
fected personal data and data processing capabilities with respect to that 
data. Secondly, the Directive is one of the more comprehensive examples of 
data protection legislation in the modern world. Thus, any perceived short-
comings in the Directive will be instructive for future developments in pri-
vacy law in other countries. 
II. FRAMEWORK OF THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 
A.  Personal Data 
The Directive was implemented in 1995 to address perceived 
threats to individual privacy and autonomy as a result of disharmonized 
laws protecting individual privacy throughout the European Union. Member 
States’ laws in the 1990s varied on the amount of protection provided to 
individuals, particularly as digital technologies became increasingly wide-
spread.6 The Directive aimed to ensure fair information gathering practices 
  
out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression 
only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing 
freedom of expression. 
Id.  
 5  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8(1), 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention] (“Everyone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”). 
 6   See Directive, supra note 3, at recital 4 (“Whereas increasingly frequent recourse is 
being had in the Community to the processing of personal data in the various spheres of 
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pertaining to individuals.7 It also sought to ensure that individuals were able 
to access data gathered about them.8 Some protected classes of informa-
tion—such as information relating to race, health, sex life, and political opi-
nions—were given greater protections than others.9 In other words, a more 
stringent set of standards relating to the access and use of protected classes 
of information was put in place under the Directive.10 
Article 1(1) of the Directive sets out its key objective: “Member 
States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, 
and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of per-
sonal data.”11 The Directive is addressed to Member States, rather than citi-
zens, because European Union directives operate as mandates to Member 
States to ensure that domestic laws comply with the requirements of the 
directive. The key terms in Article 1(1) for the purposes of this discussion 
  
economic and social activity; whereas the progress made in information technology is mak-
ing the processing and exchange of such data considerably easier.”) Recital 5 reads:  
Whereas the economic and social integration resulting from the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market within the meaning of Article 7a of the Treaty 
will necessarily lead to a substantial increase in cross-border flows of personal data 
between all those involved in a private or public capacity in economic and social 
activity in the Member States; whereas the exchange of personal data between un-
dertakings in different Member States is set to increase; whereas the national au-
thorities in the various Member States are being called upon by virtue of Commu-
nity law to collaborate and exchange personal data so as to be able to perform their 
duties or carry out tasks on behalf of an authority in another Member State within 
the context of the area without internal frontiers as constituted by the internal  
market. 
Id. at recital 5. Recital 7 reads:  
Whereas the difference in levels of protection of the rights and freedoms of indi-
viduals, notably the right to privacy, with regard to the processing of personal data 
afforded in the Member States may prevent the transmission of such data from the 
territory of one Member State to that of another Member State; whereas this differ-
ence may therefore constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of a number of economic 
activities at Community level, distort competition and impede authorities in the 
discharge of their responsibilities under Community law; whereas this difference in 
levels of protection is due to the existence of a wide variety of national laws, regu-
lations and administrative provisions. 
Id. at recital 7. 
 7   See id. art. 6(1)(b) (requiring Member States to ensure that personal data is only col-
lected for “specified, explicit and legitimate purposes.”). 
 8   Id. art. 12 (discussing data subjects’ rights to access personal data). 
 9   See id. art. 8(1) (providing special protections for personal data revealing racial or eth-
nic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and 
data concerning health or sex life). 
 10  Id. (providing that Member States shall prohibit the processing of special categories of 
data unless an exception in Article 8(2) applies). 
 11  Id. art. 1(1). 
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are processing and personal data. If information is not personal data or is 
not being processed as contemplated by the Directive, the Directive will not 
apply. The question for the age of digital multi-media files is whether the 
concept of personal data processing contemplates now-common activities 
involving the gathering and dissemination of audio, image, video, and mul-
ti-media content in readily accessible and transmittable digital file formats. 
While personal data is defined broadly in the Directive as “any in-
formation relating to an identified or identifiable natural person,”12 the ex-
tent to which this definition extends beyond text-based records is open to 
question.13 The recitals to the Directive illustrate that the question of the 
Directive’s application to sound and image files, for example, was contem-
plated by the drafters, but that they were not necessarily sure how practices 
would develop with respect to these kinds of files. Recital 14 states that: 
“[G]iven the importance of the developments under way, in the framework 
of the information society, of the techniques used to capture, transmit, ma-
nipulate, record, store or communicate sound and image data relating to 
natural persons, this Directive should be applicable to processing involving 
such data.”14 The recital suggests that at least audio files and still images 
were intended to be subject to the provisions of the Directive. However, the 
recital does not specifically contemplate multi-media files or video files in 
the sense of moving images—although the reference to image data may be 
intended to encapsulate both still and moving images. Likewise, the phrase 
sound and image data may have been intended to encapsulate multi-media 
file formats⎯that is, formats where sound and image data are combined. 
Recital 14 should be read in conjunction with Recital 17. The latter 
recital contemplates some limitations on the Directive’s application to 
sound and image files in certain contexts. It states that: 
[A]s far as the processing of sound and image data carried out for purposes 
of journalism or the purposes of literary or artistic expression is concerned, 
in particular in the audiovisual field, the principles of the Directive are to 
  
 12  Id. art. 2(a). 
 13  See First Report on the Implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), at 
20, COM (2003) 265 final (May. 15, 2003) [hereinafter First Report], available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/oct/com-implentation-1995-dir.pdf. This report read:  
During the Directive’s preparation, some people were concerned that it might not 
be able to cope with future technological developments. The extent of such tech-
nological developments was uncertain, but there was concern that a text drafted 
mainly with text processing in mind could encounter difficulties when applied to 
the processing of sound and image data. For this reason, Article 33 contains a spe-
cific reference to sound and image data.  
Id. 
 14  Directive, supra note 3, at recital 14. 
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apply in a restricted manner according to the provisions laid down in Ar-
ticle 9.15 
Article 9 deals with freedom of expression. It states that: 
Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations from the pro-
visions of [the Directive] for the processing of personal data carried out 
solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expres-
sion only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the 
rules governing freedom of expression.16  
While Article 9 relates to personal data generally in the contexts of 
journalism and intellectual property, it is interesting that Recital 17 contem-
plates that audiovisual data should be given particular deference in this con-
text. This makes sense given the need for print and broadcast media to rely 
on audio recordings and visual images in collecting information and for 
disseminating news stories in the digital age. There is also a reference to 
artistic and literary expression—clearly contemplating that audio and visual 
works are often the most important subjects of intellectual property protec-
tion, notably under copyright law. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the 
drafters of the Directive perceived a higher likelihood of a future clash be-
tween privacy and free speech in the audiovisual context than in the context 
of text records. It suggests an implicit focus of the Directive on commercial 
and governmental aggregations of text records which are less likely to be 
the direct subject of news reporting or copyright claims. 
The words of Recital 17 are prescient given the modern rise of 
claims involving video privacy and free speech in the media reporting con-
text.17 Many of the claims involve the balance between privacy rights and 
free expression as fundamental human rights under the ECHR. While the 
balance between privacy and free expression has historically been difficult 
in many jurisdictions, it is particularly noteworthy that modern cases involv-
ing digital age journalism increasingly involve video rather than text.18 Brit-
  
 15  Id. at recital 17. 
 16  Id. art. 9. 
 17  See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Limited, [2004] UKHL 22 (2002), available at 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd040506/campbe-
1.htm (claim by supermodel Naomi Campbell for breach of confidence and infringement of 
privacy rights in respect of text data and photographs relating to her treatment for narcotics 
addiction); Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Limited, [2008] EWHC 1777 (Q.B.), availa-
ble at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2008/1777.html (claim for infringement  
of privacy rights of public figure in respect of both text and video files relating to a sex  
scandal). 
 18  See cases cited supra note 17. 
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ish judges in recent years have noted important qualitative differences be-
tween video and text records in the context of privacy claims.19 
Even though Recital 14 contemplates the Directive’s application to 
audio and video files, and there is nothing in the Directive’s definition of 
personal data that explicitly suggests a limitation to text records, it is useful 
to consider Article 33 in the privacy context. This article states that:  
The Commission shall examine, in particular, the application of this Direc-
tive to the data processing of sound and image data relating to natural per-
sons and shall submit any appropriate proposals which prove to be neces-
sary, taking account of developments in information technology and in the 
light of the state of progress in the information society.20 
Even though the Directive apparently applied to sound and image data from 
day one, the European Parliament appears to have had some concerns about 
how the operation of the Directive to non-text data might play out in future 
practice. The Parliament assumed that further examinations of the applica-
bility of the Directive to non-text data would likely be necessary. A detailed 
mechanism is set out in Articles 29 and 30 of the Directive to enable such 
examinations to take place periodically. 
To date, there is little evidence that the European Commission’s 
subsequent reviews of the Directive will lead to a major reworking of its 
provisions, particularly those relating to sound and image files. In the 2003 
review of the Directive, the European Commission commented about sound 
and image files containing personal data. Its findings were inconclusive, 
suggesting in the final analysis that:  
Despite the doubts raised during the negotiation of the Directive, Member 
States have . . . reached the conclusion that the Directive’s ambition to be 
technology-neutral is achieved, at least as regards the processing of sound 
and image data.  
No Member State or other contributor has proposed modifications to the 
Directive in this regard.21  
The 2003 review also noted that some issues had been handed to a Working 
Party for further discussion,22 notably issues of video surveillance.23 The 
Working Party, in fact, released both a Working Document in November of 
  
 19  See Mosley, [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), ¶¶ 16–23 (noting qualitative differences be-
tween video and text files in the context of privacy claims). 
 20  Directive, supra note 3, art. 33. 
 21  First Report, supra note 13, at 20. 
 22  See Directive, supra note 3, art. 29(1) (establishing the Working Party to review the 
operation of the Directive). 
 23  First Report, supra note 13, at 20. 
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2002,24 and an Opinion in February of 200425 canvassing the operation of 
the Directive to various kinds of video surveillance.26 In principle, the 
Working Party accepted the importance of the application of the Directive 
to video surveillance activities.27 
The 2009 review of the Directive was more aggressive in its rec-
ommendations on the future of the Directive. However, these recommenda-
tions were not focused on concerns about sound and image files. The Com-
mission more generally suggested that the Directive is “outdated, in terms 
of technology and regulatory approach,”28 and that “[i]ts scope is becoming 
increasingly unclear, for example in on-line and surveillance contexts.”29 
The Commission concluded:  
Overall, we found that as we move toward an increasingly global, net-
worked environment, the Directive as it stands will not suffice in the long 
term. The widely applauded principles of the Directive will remain as a 
useful front-end, yet will need to be supported with a harms-based back-
end in due course, in order to be able to cope with the challenges of globa-
lisation [sic] and flows of personal data.  
However, it was also widely recognised [sic] that value can still be ex-
tracted from current arrangements and that a lot can still be achieved very 
quickly by better implementation of the Directive, for instance by estab-
lishing common interpretations of several key concepts and a possible shift 
in emphasis in the interpretation of other concepts.30 
In the 2009 review, the emphasis was on developing a new, more 
global, and more participatory approach to the protection of individual pri-
vacy generally, and to the identification of individual privacy harms that 
  
 24  Working Document on the Processing of Personal Data by Means of Video Surveil-
lance, 11750/02/EN WP 89 (Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Working Document: Video Surveil-
lance], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/wpdocs/2002 
_en.htm.  
 25  Opinion 4/2004 on the Processing of Personal Data by Means of Video Surveillance, 
11750/02/EN WP 89 (Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Opinion: Video Surveillance], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/wpdocs/2004_en.htm. 
 26  Working Document: Video Surveillance, supra note 24, at 2–3 (listing different catego-
ries of video surveillance). 
 27  Id. at 5–7. 
 28  Richard Thomas, Foreword to NEIL ROBINSON ET AL., REVIEW OF EU DATA PROTECTION 
DIRECTIVE: SUMMARY 2 (May 2009) [hereinafter 2009 REVIEW], available at 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/
review_of_eu_dp_directive_summary.pdf. 
 29  Id. 
 30  NEIL ROBINSON ET AL., REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 41 
(2009), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR710.pdf. 
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should be appropriately protected by laws and best practices.31 Such an ap-
proach would by its nature encompass privacy threats involving audio, vid-
eo, and multi-media files. The importance of this issue has been recognized 
further by an Opinion on online social networking released in June of 2009 
by a Working Group on the Directive.32  
The 2009 Working Group report recognized the importance of on-
line social network providers understanding their rights and responsibilities 
with respect to the “processing of sensitive data and images.”33 Prior to that, 
the Working Group had released an Opinion on the concept of personal data 
in 2007.34 In this Opinion, the Working Group clarified its position on 
sound and image data and, in particular, the extent to which such data was 
intended to be included within the definition of personal data in the Direc-
tive. Attempting to clarify any lingering doubts under Article 33, the Work-
ing Group noted: 
Considering the format of the medium on which . . . information is con-
tained, the concept of personal data includes information available in 
whatever form, be it alphabetical, numerical, graphical, photographical or 
acoustic, for example. It includes information kept on paper, as well as in-
formation stored in a computer memory by means of binary code, or on a 
videotape, for instance. This is a logical consequence of covering automat-
ic processing of personal data within its scope. In particular, sound and 
image data qualify as personal data from this point of view, insofar as they 
may represent information on an individual. In this regard, the particular 
reference to sound and image data in Article 33 of the Directive has to be 
understood as a confirmation and clarification that this sort of data is in-
deed included within its scope (provided all other conditions are fulfilled), 
and that the Directive applies to them.35 
The Working Group goes on to cite Recital 14 of the Directive36 as 
further evidence that the Directive is intended to apply to sound and image 
  
 31  Id. at 2–3 (identifying four distinct classes of privacy harms—information based harm, 
information inequality, information injustice, and restriction of moral autonomy). 
 32  Opinion 5/2009 on Online Social Networking, 01189/09/EN WP 163 (June 12, 2009) 
[hereinafter Opinion: Online Social Networking], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_ 
home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf. 
 33  Id. at 3. 
 34  Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, 01248/07/EN WP 136 (June 20, 
2007) [hereinafter Opinion: Personal Data], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home 
/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf. 
 35  Id. at 7–8 (first emphasis in original, second and third emphasis added). 
 36  Directive, supra note 3, at recital 14 (“Whereas, given the importance of the develop-
ments under way, in the framework of the information society, of the techniques used to 
capture, transmit, manipulate, record, store or communicate sound and image data relating to 
natural persons, this Directive should be applicable to processing involving such data.”). 
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files.37 The Working Group makes special reference to video surveillance, 
stating that “[i]mages of individuals captured by a video surveillance system 
can be personal data to the extent that the individuals are recognizable.”38 
Despite the assurances that the Directive applies to audio and video data, 
and that generally European Union countries’ laws have been found ade-
quate to encompass such data,39 commentators over the years have raised 
concerns about the lack of privacy in some European Union countries as a 
result of video surveillance technologies.40 
B.  Information Processing 
As noted in the previous section, Article 1(1) of the Directive ex-
plains the Directive’s aims in terms of protecting privacy “with respect to 
the processing of personal data.”41 The term processing is defined broadly to 
encapsulate “any operation or set of operations which is performed upon 
personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, re-
cording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consulta-
tion, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.”42 
While potentially not so obvious to the drafters of the Directive, modern 
technology increasingly allows many of these operations to be carried out 
with respect to data in audio, video, and multi-media formats. Consider, for 
example, the case of an online social network such as Facebook.  
Facebook obviously collects, records, organizes, and stores data 
about its users in multiple formats—including text, audio, and video for-
mats. This is made clear in an Opinion of the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party on online social networking released in June of 2009.43 The 
Opinion notes:  
SNS [Social Network Service] providers are data controllers under the Da-
ta Protection Directive. They provide the means for the processing of user 
data and provide all the “basic” services related to user management (e.g. 
registration and deletion of accounts). SNS providers also determine the 
  
 37  Opinion: Personal Data, supra note 34, at 8. 
 38  Id. 
 39  See First Report, supra note 13, at 5. 
 40  See, e.g., David Rowan, Britain ‘Leads Way’ in Eroding Privacy, LONDON TIMES, Sept. 
5, 2002, at 16 (raising concerns about intrusive video surveillance in Britain); Adam Sage, 
French Unease Grows over Spread of Secret Surveillance, LONDON TIMES, August 11, 1994 
(raising concerns about use of video surveillance in France); Veronica Cowan, If You Feel 
That You Are Being Watched, LONDON TIMES, Sept. 19, 2000 (describing rise of video sur-
veillance activities in the U.K.).  
 41  Directive, supra note 3, art. 1(1). 
 42  Id. art. 2(b). 
 43  Opinion: Online Social Networking, supra note 32. 
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use that may be made of user data for advertising and marketing purpos-
es—including advertising provided by third parties.44 
What about video surveillance, such as that used by many govern-
ments and private entities in the U.K. with Closed Circuit Television 
(CCTV) cameras?45 Capturing images by means of CCTV cameras certainly 
appears to amount to collection or recording of data as contemplated by the 
Directive’s notion of processing. When the data is stored in systems con-
nected to CCTV cameras, this would likely amount to storage of data under 
the Directive. When information is accessed by the owners of the cameras, 
this would likely be “retrieval,” “consultation,” or “use” as contemplated by 
the Directive’s definition of processing. 
C.  Exceptions to the Operation of the Directive 
1.  Copyright and freedom of expression 
Not all activities relating to the processing of personal data will fall 
within the ambit of the Directive. There are some express carve-outs that 
may apply to information in audio, video, and multi-media formats. The 
exceptions in Article 9 have been mentioned in a previous section.46 This is 
the Article that requires Member States to provide exemptions for the 
“processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or 
the purpose of artistic or literary expression.”47 However, these exemptions 
should only be created “if they are necessary to reconcile the right to priva-
cy with the rules governing freedom of expression.”48 Recital 17 contem-
plates that this Article may have particular resonance in the audiovisual 
field.49 
Questions involving the balance between free expression and priva-
cy are always difficult to resolve. They must be addressed in the context of 
any constitutional protections for speech and privacy as basic human rights. 
Different jurisdictions vary with respect to constitutional protections for 
speech and privacy. The U.S., for example, has strong express protections 
for free speech and for a free press under the First Amendment to the Con-
  
 44  Id. at 5. 
 45  See Patrick Foster, Big Brother Surveillance Means No One Is Safe, Experts Warn, 
LONDON TIMES, March 27, 2007, at 25 (discussing risks inherent in use of CCTV cameras in 
Britain). 
 46  See supra Part II.A. 
 47  Directive, supra note 3, art. 9. 
 48  Id. 
 49  See supra Part II.A. 
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stitution.50 However, there is no express constitutional right to privacy.51 
While the ECHR contains express protections for both speech and privacy 
as fundamental human rights,52 relevant articles have been implemented in 
national laws in a piecemeal fashion. For example, the U.K. did not ac-
knowledge express guarantees of free speech and privacy until the enact-
ment of the Human Rights Act of 1998.53 
Because of the relatively recent adoption of speech and privacy as 
legal rights in the U.K., British courts have struggled with the best way to 
achieve a balance of those interests as required under the Human Rights 
Act.54 Additionally, whilst dealing with that basic problem they are faced 
with the need to differentiate the application of these rights in cases involv-
ing different digital file formats. British courts have acknowledged that vid-
eo images, for example, raise different privacy concerns to textual descrip-
tions of an event in the context of journalism.55 Thus, when balancing  
the right to free speech against the right to privacy, a court will consider  
the format of the personal information as a relevant factor in making its  
determination.56 
The important point here for the application of Article 9 of the Di-
rective is that this article cannot be applied in a vacuum. It cannot be as-
sumed in any given case that if a speech interest or a copyright interest is 
implicated, the protections of the Directive will not apply. The Directive 
itself makes this clear by contemplating a balance between expression and 
privacy in the wording of Article 9—the words themselves require a balance 
between expression and privacy.57 However, in cases where, say, a journal-
  
 50  U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”). 
 51  DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 33 (2d ed. 2006) (“Although the 
United States Constitution does not specifically mention privacy, it has a number of provi-
sions that protect privacy, and has been interpreted as providing a right to privacy.”). 
 52  Convention, supra note 5, art. 8(1) (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence.”); art. 10(1) (“Everyone has the right  
to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of  
frontiers.”). 
 53  Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.). 
 54  See, e.g., Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Limited, [2008] EWHC 1777 ¶¶ 7–15 
(Q.B.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2008/1777.html (describing 
the need for a new approach to balancing privacy and expression under the Human Rights 
Act of 1998). 
 55  Id. ¶¶ 16–23. 
 56  See id. 
 57  Directive, supra note 3, art. 9. Article 9 reads: 
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ist has received a potentially damaging video of an individual and has a 
valid argument about publishing it in the public interest, it may be that the 
speech interest will take precedence over a privacy claim. Article 9 of the 
Directive seems implicitly to contemplate such a result. 
The case of a journalist obtaining a damaging video of an individual 
is a good example of the way in which today’s digital technologies push the 
boundaries of privacy law. Today, many systems are open rather than 
closed. It is easy to disseminate damaging images and other information 
globally at the push of a button. Once an image or other information is “out 
of the box”—say, because a journalist obtained it from a private company’s 
CCTV system or from a paid photographer—further global dissemination of 
that information could be extremely damaging to the individual. Yet, if the 
dissemination has public interest merit, the disclosure may be excused, de-
spite the provisions of the Directive. 
2.  Personal or household use 
Article 3(2) provides that the Directive does not apply to the 
processing of data “by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or 
household activity.”58 This exception provides interesting challenges in the 
context of a global information society, particularly in the age of Web 2.0 
where the Internet is more interactive and contains more user-generated 
content.59 Interestingly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the 2003 
Lindqvist decision interpreted Article 3(2) as not excusing the posting on a 
publicly available website of gossipy text relating to private individuals by a 
peer who worked in a church with the data subjects.60 In this case, and in the 
subsequent European Commission Working Party Opinion on online social 
networking, the court—and the Working Party—found decisive the public 
character of the disclosure of personal information.61 The argument here 
seems to be that once a user makes a conscious decision to disseminate per-
  
Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations from the provisions of 
this Chapter, Chapter IV and Chapter VI for the processing of personal data carried 
out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression 
only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing 
freedom of expression. 
Id. 
 58  Id. art. 3(2). 
 59  JANET LOWE, GOOGLE SPEAKS: SECRETS OF THE WORLD’S GREATEST BILLIONAIRE 
ENTREPRENEURS, SERGEY BRIN AND LARRY PAGE 294 (2009) (defining Web 2.0 as “[a] term 
used to describe an evolving generation of a participatory Web. Web 2.0 describes the proli-
feration of interconnectivity and social interaction on the World Wide Web.”). 
 60  Case C-101/01, In re Bodil Lindqvist, ¶¶ 46–48 (E.C.J. Nov. 6, 2003), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/index_en.htm. 
 61  Id. ¶ 47; Opinion: Online Social Networking, supra note 32, at 6. 
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sonal information beyond a group of friends or close contacts, the user be-
comes a “data controller”62 for the purposes of the Directive and is subject 
to its restrictions on processing of personal data.63 
While the Lindqvist case contemplated text based data, it seems 
likely that similar reasoning would apply to audio, video, and multi-media 
content disclosed publicly on the Internet. The Working Party Opinion con-
templates both “data and images.”64 Thus, it is likely that non-text informa-
tion disclosed publicly on digital services would potentially be covered by 
the Directive provided that the information fell within the broad definition 
of personal data.65 Of course, difficulties in distinguishing closed dissemina-
tions from open disseminations of information are likely to arise with re-
spect to some of today’s technologies. If the concern of the ECJ and the 
Working Party was with public disclosures of information outside a specific 
social sphere, how should we, for example, characterize disclosures over 
online social networks? Would posting information on a closed site such as 
Facebook contravene the Directive, provided that only Facebook “friends” 
could access the material? Bear in mind that individuals can have large 
numbers of friends on Facebook, many of whom they have never actually 
met in the “real world.”66  
In the Lindqvist case, the ECJ raised an additional concern about 
personal information. The disclosure in question concerned particularly 
sensitive information relating to a health condition—a foot injury.67 Health 
information is one of the categories of sensitive information that receives 
special protection under the Directive.68 Such information cannot be 
processed without the explicit consent of the data subject.69 While the in-
  
 62  Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(d) (defining “controller” in the context of data as meaning 
“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or joint-
ly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”). 
 63  See Opinion: Online Social Networking, supra note 32, at 6. 
 64  Id. at 3 (Executive Summary). 
 65  Directive, supra note 3, art.2 (a) (defining “personal data” as “any information relating 
to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one 
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity.”). 
 66  See James Grimmelman, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1154 (2009) (noting 
that online social networking services can be used both to maintain contact with real world 
friends or to make new friends who you have never met in the real world). 
 67  Case C-101/01, In re Bodil Lindqvist, ¶ 13 (E.C.J. Nov. 6, 2003), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/index_en.htm. 
 68  Directive, supra note 3, art. 8(1) (“Member States shall prohibit the processing of per-
sonal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 69  Id.; Opinion: Online Social Networking, supra note 32, at 8. 
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formation in Lindqvist was a textual description of the injury, the question 
has arisen subsequently as to whether video data in particular should be 
regarded as sensitive information per se because of its ability to disclose or 
encapsulate race, sex, ethnic origins, or potentially religious beliefs.70 Some 
European Union Member States automatically regard video images of data 
subjects as sensitive information for this reason.71 However, that view was 
not endorsed by the Data Protection Working Party in its 2007 Opinion on 
online social networks.72 The Working Party expressed the view that images 
are not necessarily sensitive data unless they “are clearly used to reveal sen-
sitive data about individuals.”73  
In its Opinion on online social networks, the Working Party took 
some pains to describe the extent to which the “personal or household use” 
exception might apply to online social networks like Facebook and MyS-
pace. In particular, the Working Party took the view that users of these ser-
vices are generally not “data controllers” for the purposes of the Directive 
and will generally not be subject to its provisions provided that they are 
engaging in purely personal activities contained within a network of 
friends.74 However, the Working Party suggested that there will be some 
circumstances in which activities on an online social network may go 
beyond the personal or household use exception. Examples include (1) situ-
ations where a social network is used as a collaboration platform for an as-
sociation or company to advance commercial, political, or charitable 
goals;75 (2) situations where a user has acquired a high number of contacts 
  
 70  See Opinion: Online Social Networking, supra note 32, at 8. 
 71  Id.  
In some EU Member States, images of data subjects are considered a special cate-
gory of personal data since they may be used to distinguish between racial/ethnic 
origins or may be used to deduce religious beliefs or health data. The Working Par-
ty in general does not consider images on the Internet to be sensitive data, unless 
the images are clearly used to reveal sensitive data about individuals. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. at 5 (“In most cases, users [of online social networks] are considered to be data 
subjects. The Directive does not impose the duties of a data controller on an individual who 
processes data ‘in the course of a purely personal or household activity’ . . . .”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 75  Id. at 6. Section 3.1.1 reads:  
If an SNS user acts on behalf of a company or association, or uses the SNS mainly 
as a platform to advance commercial, political or charitable goals, the [household 
use] exception does not apply. Here, the user assumes the full responsibilities of a 
data controller who is disclosing personal data to another data controller (SNS) and 
to third parties (other SNS users or potentially even other data controllers with 
access to the data). In these circumstances, the user needs the consent of the per-
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or “friends” including a high number of contacts that she does not actually 
know in person;76 and (3) situations where the rights of third parties in rela-
tion to their personal data are implicated by an individual’s use of an online 
social network.77 
The third situation contemplated above is relevant to surveillance 
issues. Surveillance activities involve the gathering of information about 
third parties without their knowledge and potentially also involve the unau-
thorized use or dissemination of that information without their consent. If an 
online social network user—or any other Internet user for that matter—
obtains audio, video, or multi-media content pertaining to a data subject and 
utilizes it online without that person’s consent, she may have contravened 
the provisions of the Directive. In a closed network like Facebook, the dis-
semination of information about a third party might contravene the Direc-
tive if the dissemination goes beyond a group of friends of the third party, 
particularly given that the third party has effectively lost control of the  
information. However, the Directive’s provisions here are unclear, and the 
Working Group on online social networks hedges its bets on this point  
by noting that “even if the household exemption applies, a user might be 
liable according to general provisions of national civil or criminal laws in 
question (e.g., defamation, liability in tort for violation of personality, penal 
liability).”78 
3.  National security 
Along with the personal and household use exemption, Article 3(2) 
of the Directive also exempts from the operation of the Directive 
“processing operations concerning public security, defence [sic], State secu-
rity (including the economic well-being of the State when the processing 
operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in 
  
sons concerned or some other legitimate basis provided by the Data Protection Di-
rective. 
Id. 
 76  Id. Section 3.1.3 reads further: 
Typically, access to data . . . contributed by a user is limited to self-selected con-
tacts. In some cases however, users may acquire a high number of third party con-
tacts, some of whom he may not actually know. A high number of contacts could 
be an indication that the household exception does not apply and therefore that the 
user would be considered a data controller. 
Id. 
 77  Id. (“The application of the household exemption is also constrained by the need to 
guarantee the rights of third parties, particularly with regard to sensitive data.”). 
 78  Id. at 6–7 (“[I]t must be noted that even if the household exemption applies, a user 
might be liable according to general provisions of national civil or criminal laws in question 
(e.g. defamation, liability in tort for violation of personality, penal liability).”). 
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areas of criminal law.”79 While this exemption would clearly cover fairly 
broadly conceived surveillance activities undertaken for the purposes of 
public security or defense, it would not capture all forms of surveillance. 
The U.K. is an interesting case study on video surveillance because 
of the large scope of CCTV monitoring throughout the country and the lack 
of apparent controls on this monitoring despite the privacy protections in  
the Directive and the ECHR. It has been reported that nobody currently 
knows how many CCTV cameras are in operation in the U.K., although a 
rough study suggested that there are currently around five-million cameras 
operating in Britain.80 Surveillance cameras can be used for a variety of 
purposes as recognized by the European Commission Working Group in  
its 2004 Opinion on video surveillance.81 Purposes for using video surveil-
lance include: protection of property; protection of individuals; public inter-
est; detection, prevention, and control of offences; and making available of 
evidence.82  
Some of these purposes would fall within the ambit of the public 
security exemption in Article 3(2) of the Directive, but probably not all. 
Where a CCTV system is used to protect private property, and is used by a 
private company, the company is probably a “data controller” under the 
Directive and subject to the restrictions on the processing of personal video 
data. The protection of property is probably not a matter of public security, 
defense, or State security. As there are no definitions in the Directive of the 
terms “public security,” “defence [sic],” and “State security,” the scope of 
the exemption for these activities is unclear. Some surveillance activities 
clearly aimed at protecting the public from, say, violent crime or terrorist 
attacks will likely meet the criterion for the exemption.83 Nevertheless, 
many more common uses of video surveillance will be questionable. Thus, 
the Directive will apply in a piecemeal fashion to video surveillance activi-
ties depending on who is doing the data gathering and for what purposes. 
  
 79  Directive, supra note 3, art. 3(2). 
 80  Foster, supra note 45 (“Britain has about five million CCTV cameras, one for every 12 
people.”) (quoting Ian Forbes, co-author of a report by the Royal Academy of Engineering, 
Dilemmas of Privacy and Surveillance—Challenges of Technological Change). 
 81  Opinion: Video Surveillance, supra note 25, at 1–5 (listing different motivations for 
video surveillance). 
 82  Id. 
 83  However, note the balanced tone taken on protecting privacy in the face of concerns 
about terrorism after the 9/11 attacks. See Opinion 10/2001 on the Need for a Balanced Ap-
proach in the Fight Against Terrorism, 5403/01/EN/Final WP 53 (Dec. 14, 2001), available 
at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/jan/wp53en.pdf. 
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III. CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DIRECTIVE 
While the discussion in Part II highlighted shortcomings of the Di-
rective with respect to modern technologies involving digital audio, video, 
and multi-media file formats, the 2009 review of the Directive’s operation 
raised more general concerns about the continued operation of the Direc-
tive.84 In reviewing the Directive, the Information Commissioner’s Office 
acknowledged new challenges for privacy law, including, in particular, the 
difficult balance between personal privacy and other social imperatives.85 In 
many ways, the ongoing analysis of laws in the European Union with re-
spect to protecting privacy, and to balancing privacy against other social 
needs, outstrip efforts to protect privacy in other jurisdictions. Thus, if there 
is a glaring need for change and a call for new approaches to privacy law in 
the European Union, those calls should be amplified in other jurisdictions 
that currently have lesser privacy protections. 
In the U.S., for example, where attempts have been made to balance 
privacy and free speech values, or privacy and national security interests, 
privacy tends more often than not to be the loser.86 The U.S. has a piece-
meal and outdated approach to privacy law which has stood up less well to 
the challenges of new digital technologies than its counterpart in the Euro-
pean Union Directive.87 American privacy law is predominantly premised 
on the four privacy torts developed prior to the digital age. As set out in the 
Restatement, the privacy torts encompass: (a) intrusion into seclusion; (b) 
public disclosure of private facts; (c) false light publicity; and (d) commer-
cial misappropriation of personal information.88 The only one of these torts 
that potentially impacts surveillance activities is intrusion into seclusion, 
and even the application of that tort is problematic as it is premised on the 
shifting notion of reasonable expectations of privacy.89 Additionally, to the 
  
 84  2009 REVIEW, supra note 28, at xi (advocating recasting the Directive to become a more 
globally consistent set of general principles concerning privacy protection). 
 85  Id. at viii (“Within the contexts of rapid technological change and globalization, a set of 
distinct challenges were identified . . . . [U]nder what circumstances can personal privacy 
become secondary to the needs of society, considering the fundamental importance of priva-
cy protection for the development of a democratic society as a whole?”). 
 86  See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON 
THE INTERNET 126–7 (2007) (describing historical difficulty in the U.S. of preserving privacy 
interests in the face of strong First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech). 
 87  See Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One’s Own: On Privacy and Online Social 
Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 78–81 (2007) (surveying the patchwork nature 
of American tort law as applied to online privacy incursions). 
 88  Id. at 79. 
 89  Id. at 79–80 (describing uncertainty inherent in the concept of applying a test of reason-
able expectation of privacy to the intrusion upon seclusion tort). 
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extent that the tort is applicable, it will not capture the kinds of harms that 
might result from dissemination of recorded surveillance information.90 
Related to the privacy torts is the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.91 Like the privacy torts, this tort is likely to be of limited 
use in the situations under consideration in this paper because the tort gen-
erally requires a showing of extreme distress on the part of the complainant 
resulting in physical manifestations of the distress.92 A person unaware of 
surveillance activities may not be able to show any distress, and, even 
where she becomes aware of the surveillance, her discomfort may not rise to 
the levels of damage historically required by American courts. However, 
that might change if courts reassess the contours of the tort in light of activi-
ties involving intrusive modern digital technologies.93  
Likewise, the tort of defamation is unlikely to be particularly rele-
vant for the kinds of situations under consideration in this paper. A defama-
tion action requires proof that an audio, video, or multi-media file is both 
false and harmful to the complainant’s reputation.94 This is likely an insur-
mountable hurdle in many cases involving unauthorized dissemination of 
such information online. Images and audio files are unlikely to be false for 
defamation purposes unless they have been doctored. Further, defamation 
law can do little about viral distributions of personal images or about the 
permanence problem of information when released online. Enforcement of a 
defamation order95 online can be problematic if the information in question 
  
 90  Id.  
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion addresses harmful information-gathering, but 
not the subsequent disclosure of its fruits. It would only apply if the information 
was uncovered in a furtive way from a place within which the plaintiff had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, such as a home, hotel room, a tanning booth, or a 
shopping bag. 
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). 
 91  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46 (1977); Sanchez Abril, supra note 87, at 81 
(noting limitations of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort in the online social 
networking context). 
 92  Sanchez Abril, supra note 87, at 81 (noting that the tort is ineffectual in the online social 
networking context because conduct in question is usually not sufficiently “extreme and 
outrageous” and because many courts require physical manifestations of the claimed emo-
tional distress) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46(1) (1965)). 
 93  JON MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 195 (2008) (“The law [on intentional infliction of 
emotional distress] is still in a stage of development, and the ultimate limits of this tort have 
not yet been determined.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46, cmt. c (1977)). 
 94  Sanchez Abril, supra note 87, at 79 (noting that although the plaintiff in an online social 
network, for example, may well have suffered indelible harm to her reputation, it is difficult 
to establish a defamation claim with respect to true information). 
 95  Jennifer Meredith Liebman, Defamed by a Blogger: Legal Protections, Self Regulation 
and Other Failures, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 343, 368–72 (2006) (describing differ-
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exists on multiple websites and in multiple jurisdictions by the time the or-
der is made.96 Additionally, online intermediaries such as Internet service 
providers, who serve as conduits for potentially defamatory content—and 
are often the easiest potential defendants to identify—, are generally im-
mune from liability.97 Further, the defamation action does little to chill the 
actual gathering of information if that is the complainant’s basic concern. It 
only potentially comes into play at the dissemination stage when the genie 
may well be so far out of the bottle that it is difficult to achieve any form of 
redress for the complainant. 
While American criminal procedure incorporates some notions of 
privacy as implicit requisites of the due process clause in the Constitution, 
these notions of privacy also rely on an often-shifting concept of the “rea-
sonable expectations of privacy.”98 As intrusive surveillance technologies 
become more advanced, courts have struggled with establishing an appro-
priate bar for the reasonable expectation of privacy test,99 and, of course, 
criminal procedure notions of privacy are only applicable to criminal pro-
ceedings, while much surveillance does not result in criminal cases.  
The position on privacy in the U.S. is much more disharmonized 
and piecemeal than that in the European Union. Even so, the European Un-
ion is likely to move towards a newer and more comprehensive approach to 
privacy to meet the needs of the Web 2.0 society. The fact that the European 
Union Member States have so much experience with a comprehensive pri-
vacy law and are now in a position to evaluate it and improve upon it could 
in fact serve as a useful guide for law and policy makers in the U.S. Rather 
than reinventing the wheel and starting from scratch, if there is sufficient 
  
ent kinds of defamation remedies that may be sought online including a retraction, an injunc-
tion, and damages). 
 96  Id. at 375 (noting that even if the complainant obtains a retraction by the original poster 
of defamatory context, the information is likely available in many other places online, in-
cluding places like the Internet Archive Project that preserves information that has already 
been retracted from websites). 
 97  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another informa-
tion content provider.”).  
 98  DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 2–3 (2008).  
Although the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly mention the word “privacy,” it 
safeguards the sanctity of the home and the confidentiality of communications 
from government intrusion. The Supreme Court has concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment protects against government searches whenever a person has a “rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. 
Id. (citation omitted). See also Sanchez Abril, supra note 87, at 79–80 (discussing the notion 
of “reasonable expectations of privacy” in the context of American tort law). 
 99  SOLOVE, supra note 98, at 71–74 (describing practical problems inherent in applying the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test in both criminal and tort law contexts in the U.S.). 
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political will in the U.S. to change the position on global privacy, legislators 
here can take up where the European Union has ended up after fifteen years 
of experience with the Directive. The U.S. could potentially work with the 
European Union to implement a global and participatory approach to infor-
mation privacy that resolves problems posed to privacy from audio, video, 
and multi-media technologies, as well as resolving more complex problems 
about information privacy. The next decade may provide a good opportunity 
to strike a much-improved global balance between privacy and other impor-
tant social needs such as freedom of expression and public security. 
 
